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CITATION TO THE RECORD 
All citations to the record on appeal shall be as follows: 
"R." followed by the page number where the referenced portion of 
the record can be located. 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(k). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Whether the Utah Court of Appeals should uphold the order of 
the district court dismissing APS's claims against Vaughn Pulsip-
her, which order is based upon the court's ruling that when a co-
obligator who provides real property as security for a loan files 
bankruptcy, the statute of limitations is not tolled as against 
co-obligors who are not trustors under the deed of trust; have 
provided no security as collateral for the loan and who are not 
parties to any bankruptcy during the statute of limitations 
period. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Mr. Pulsipher concedes that an appellate court need not 
defer to the legal conclusions of the trial court. See, e.g., 
Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d 
1382, 1385 (Utah 1989). 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23(2): 
Within six years: 
(2) An action upon any contract, 
obligation or liability founded 
upon an instrument in writing, 
except those mentioned in Section 
78-12-22. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-37-1: 
There can be one action for the 
recovery of any debt or the en-
forcement of any right secured 
solely by mortgage upon real es-
tate. . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
a. Nature of the Case 
APS filed an action against Vaughn Pulsipher to collect on a 
promissory note which he signed as a "co-maker." The note was 
secured by a deed of trust executed by Autumn Development and 
Construction Company ("Autumn Development") who alone offered 
real property as collateral. Mr. Pulsipher offered no collateral 
for the note and did not sign the deed of trust. 
APS claims no payments were ever made under the loan. The 
last payment due under the note was scheduled for June 18, 1987. 
More than six years after the last date payment was due, APS 
filed a lawsuit against Mr. Pulsipher and others. APS argues the 
combined effect of Autumn Development's bankruptcy and Utah's 
"one action rule" (Utah Code Ann. § 78-37-1) tolled the statute 
of limitations. 
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Mr. Pulsipher claims that because he was not a party to the 
bankruptcy; did not sign the deed of trust and did not offer any 
real property collateral for the loan, the combined effect of 
Autumn Development's bankrupty and the "one action rule" did not 
stop the running of statute of limitations against him. Because 
APS filed its lawsuit more than six years after the last possible 
date a breach could have occurred under the note, the district 
court appropriately dismissed the case against Mr. Pulsipher. 
b. Course of Proceedings 
APS filed a complaint in district court on November 10, 
1993. Vaughn Pulsipher filed a motion to dismiss the complaint 
because the statute of limitations had run on the claims against 
him for breach of written instrument. 
c. Disposition 
The Honorable Frank G. Noel granted Mr. Pulsipher's motion 
to dismiss. Judge Noel held Autumn Development's bankruptcy did 
not toll the statute of limitations as against Mr. Pulsipher. 
APS could have pursued its claim against Mr. Pulsipher during the 
relevant period. 
APS filed a motion to reconsider reasserting its claim that 
the combined effect of Autumn Development's bankruptcy and the 
"one action rule" tolled the statute of limitations as against 
Vaughn Pulsipher. The lower court ruled APS presented no new 
material in its motion which justified reconsideration of the 
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ruling. Judge Noel reaffirmed his position that where a co-maker 
has not supplied collateral for a loan and is not within the 
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court in a bankruptcy filed by 
another co-maker who has supplied collateral for the loan, the 
statute of limitations is not tolled as against the first co-
maker. 
The court eventually certified the order dismissing Mr. 
Pulsipher from the lawsuit as a final order so that APS could 
pursue this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. Vaughn Pulsipher, along with three others, signed a 
promissory note that was secured by a deed of trust. The final 
payment under the promissory note was June 18, 1987. R. at 5-6. 
2. The note was secured by a deed of trust executed solely 
by Autumn Development as trustor. Vaughn Pulsipher offered no 
real property as collateral for the loan and did not sign the 
security instrument for the loan. R. at 70-75. 
3. No payments were ever made under the loan. R. at 2. 
4. Autumn Development, the only trustor under the deed of 
trust, eventually filed bankruptcy. R. at 49-50. 
5. An entity having lien rights in the real property 
superior to the rights of APS moved to have the automatic stay 
lifted and foreclosed on the real property. R. at 51-55. 
6. Once the security for the loan had been extinguished in 
the foreclosure, APS filed its complaint against Vaughn Pulsipher 
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and others for breach of the note- APS filed the complaint more 
than six years after the final payment was due under the note. 
R. at 1-4. 
7. Vaughn Pulsipher filed a motion to dismiss, arguing the 
six year statute of limitations for breach of a written instru-
ment had run against APSfs claims against him. R. at 27-32. The 
court granted the motion to dismiss and denied a subsequent 
motion for reconsideration. R. at 81-85 and 119-123. 
8. APS eventually filed a motion under Rule 54(b), Utah R. 
Civ. P. asking the court to certify the order of dismissal of 
Pulsipher as a final order. The court certified the order as a 
final order and APS filed it appeal on September 5, 1995. R. at 
165-169. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
There is a six year statute of limitations on written 
agreements. The complaint against Vaughn Pulsipher was filed 
more than six years after the last possible date a breach could 
have occurred under the subject promissory note. Although Vaughn 
Pulsipher signed the promissory note as a "co-maker," he was not 
a trustor under the trust deed securing the note; he offered no 
collateral as security for the loan and he was not a party to any 
bankruptcy during the statute of limitations period. 
Because Mr. Pulsipher offered no collateral for the loan, he 
was not protected by the "one action rule." Additionally, 
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because Mr. Pulsipher was not a party to any bankruptcy, the 
statute of limitations continued to run against him. 
ARGUMENT 
Vaughn Pulsipher does not contest the general proposition 
that the "one action rule" requires a mortgagee look to the 
security before taking direct action against the mortgagor, 
Vaughn Pulsipher also agrees that if a debtor who provides 
collateral to secure a loan files bankruptcy, the automatic stay 
might prevent a creditor from taking action against the collater-
al. Additionally, under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-41, a bankruptcy 
may toll the statute of limitations during the period the auto-
matic stay is in effect. However, APS ignores the fact that 
application of these basic principles to the facts and circum-
stances of the present case support dismissal of the case against 
Vaughn Pulsipher. 
In this case, Autumn Development, the sole trustor under the 
deed of trust securing the promissory note, filed bankruptcy. 
Autumn Development was the only obligor under the promissory note 
who pledged any security. Mr. Pulsipher provided no collateral 
to secure the note. Additionally, during the relevant time 
period, Vaughn Pulsipher was not a party to any bankruptcy and 
was not protected by an automatic stay. 
Other than Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-41 and Utah Code Ann. § 
78-37-1 which APS argues combine to toll the statute of limita-
tions, APS offers no legal authority to support its position that 
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the statute of limitations was tolled. The case of Surety Life 
Ins. Co. v. Smith, 892 P.2d 1 (Utah 1995) cited by APS is distin-
guishable because it does not discuss the statutes whose applica-
tion are at issue in this case. Additionally, that case does not 
involve a multi-obligor obligation where only one debtor has 
provided security and executed a trust deed. The parties have 
located no Utah case discussing the effect a bankruptcy of one of 
multiple parties to a promissory note has on a creditor's right 
to proceed against other parties who are not bankrupt and who 
have not pledged any security for the debt. 
Antideficiency statutes (or the "one action rule") such as 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-37-1 are designed to protect obligors who 
give security as collateral. The Utah Supreme Court has held the 
"one action rule" applies "only to actions between mortgagors and 
mortgagees" Pillsbury Mills, Inc. v. Nephi Processing Plant, 
Inc., 323 P.2d 266, 268 (Utah 1958). The "one action rule" 
should not apply to someone who is not a mortgagor under a 
mortgage or similarily, a trustor under a deed of trust. In this 
case, Mr. Pulsipher was not a trustor under the deed of trust and 
was not subject to the obligations under the deed of trust. 
Therefore, he was not entitled to the protection of the "one 
action rule." In other words, APS was not required to pursue the 
real property collateral before pursuing Vaughn Pulsipher direct-
ly. 
Vaughn Pulsipher submits that under the facts and circum-
stances of this case, the district court correctly interpreted 
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the effect of Utah statutory law and adopted a common sense 
approach by ruling the statute of limitations was not tolled as 
against him. 
APS makes a big deal about a distinction between the labels 
"co-maker" and "guarantor," APS argues that Mr. Pulsipher was a 
"co-maker" rather than a "guarantor" and that somehow this 
strengthens its argument. Despite the fact Mr. Pulsipher argued 
in the court below that he was effectively a guarantor because he 
offered no collateral for the loan, Judge Noel's minute entries 
acknowledge Mr. Pulsipher was a "co-maker". The distinction was 
apparently unimportant to Judge Noel. The important factors for 
analyzing these issues are the undisputed facts that although 
Pulsipher signed a note, he was not a party to the security 
instrument securing the note; he gave no collateral and was not a 
party to a bankruptcy so as to receive protection through the 
automatic stay. Even ignoring the confusing categories and 
labels of "guarantor", "maker", "co-maker" and "surety", Mr. 
Pulsipher submits the clear interpretation and intent of Utah's 
"one action rule" supports the district court's ruling that the 
statute of limitations was not tolled as against Mr. Pulsipher. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-37-1 states: 
There can be one action for the recovery of 
any debt where the enforcement of any right 
secured solely by mortgage upon real es-
tate. . . 
Autumn Development's debt was the only debt secured solely by the 
mortgage because Autumn Development was the sole owner of the 
property pledged as collateral. Mr. Pulsipher did not pledge any 
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collateral to secure the debt. Therefore, Pulsipher was not a 
trustor or mortgagor entitled to the protection of the one action 
rule. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, appellee Vaughn Pulsipher respect-
fully requests the court to affirm the ruling of the district 
court. .^p 
DATED this v — ^ day of April, 1996. 
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C. 
/Beitfiis'V:' Haslam, Esq. 
Sjohn W. Holt, Esq. 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Appellee Vaughn Pulsipher 
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